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MANAGING THE MISINFORMATION 
MARKETPLACE:  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND 
THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKE NEWS 
Daniela C. Manzi* 
 
In recent years, fake news has overtaken the internet.  Fake news 
publishers are able to disseminate false stories widely and cheaply on social 
media websites, amassing millions of likes, comments, and shares, with some 
fake news even “trending” on certain platforms.  The ease with which a 
publisher can create and spread falsehoods has led to a marketplace of 
misinformation unprecedented in size and power.  People’s vulnerability to 
fake news means that they are far less likely to receive accurate political 
information and are therefore unable to make informed decisions when 
voting.  Because a democratic system relies on an informed populace to 
determine how it should act, fake news presents a unique threat to U.S. 
democracy. 
Although fake news threatens democratic institutions, First Amendment 
protections for false speech present a significant obstacle for regulatory 
remedies.  This Note explores the ways these speech protections interfere 
with the government’s ability to protect political discourse—the process that 
enables it to function effectively—and proposes that the government regulate 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 30, 1938, the New York Times reported panic and mass 
hysteria throughout New York after radio listeners tuned into a broadcast of 
Orson Welles’s rendition of The War of the Worlds, a fictional drama about 
an alien invasion, and believed it to be true.1  After hearing the broadcast, 
families across the state reportedly fled their homes in fear of a gas attack, 
which lead to traffic and communications jams.2  How was it possible that 
thousands of people could believe something so absurd? 
As it turns out, the broadcast was not the problematic source of 
misinformation that persuaded multitudes of listeners to adopt a mistaken 
belief.  Rather, the coverage of the hysteria was the “fake news” that deceived 
people en masse.  News media grossly exaggerated the public response to the 
War of the Worlds radio program, expanding on a few anecdotal reports to 
paint a picture of mass hysteria.3 
Though the frequent use of the term “fake news” is relatively new, concern 
over the spread of misinformation is not.  In the internet age, false stories 
have taken a new and troubling hold on the information marketplace.  The 
persisting belief that the War of the Worlds broadcast created mass hysteria 
demonstrates how false news maintains a powerful grip on people’s 
understanding of events, even after such information has been repudiated.  
 
 1. Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1938, at 
1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1938/10/31/issue.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7BK8-EJGM]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. David Emery, Did the 1938 Radio Broadcast of ‘War of the Worlds’ Cause a 
Nationwide Panic?, SNOPES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/war-of-the-
worlds/ [https://perma.cc/28DG-M8FA]. 
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Technology has empowered false news publishers with the ability to 
disseminate misinformation cheaply, rapidly, and widely and to use 
deceptive techniques to shape public opinion. 
This Note explores the ways in which false news in the internet age 
receives broad First Amendment protections, yet ironically undermines a 
core purpose of the First Amendment:  to enable the free exchange of ideas 
in public debate, which shapes public opinion and informs democratic self-
governance.  Though the term “fake news” has taken on many meanings in 
public discourse, in this Note it refers to false statements of fact reported in 
online media that readers would reasonably believe are true, including both 
intentional lies and inadvertent falsehoods.4  Part I of this Note discusses the 
philosophical beliefs that have shaped jurisprudential understanding of false 
speech protection and explains how the fake news problem in the internet age 
presents unprecedented threats to democracy.  Part II describes the First 
Amendment protections for false speech and analyzes the relationship 
between these protections and the philosophical underpinnings of free speech 
theory.  Part III explains the inability to adequately restrict false speech under 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  Part IV proposes a way that the government 
can use philosophical theories of free speech protection to reimagine 
regulating fake news without violating the First Amendment. 
I.  THE GROWING FAKE NEWS PROBLEM AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
OF FALSE SPEECH PROTECTION 
This Part provides background information on the fake news problem.  
Part I.A examines the philosophical theories underlying false speech 
protection and discusses the role of free speech in society.  Within the context 
of these philosophical theories, Part I.B explains why fake news presents 
unique threats to U.S. democracy by causing confusion among news 
consumers and sowing distrust in the news media. 
 
 4. The concept of fake news has existed for centuries, with mentions of “false news” 
stories dating back to the 1500s and the term “fake news” used as early as 1890. The Real 
Story of ‘Fake News,’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-
play/the-real-story-of-fake-news [https://perma.cc/YNT8-QZHA] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  
More recently, the term “fake news” has become popular after proliferation of the term by 
President Donald Trump on Twitter.  President Trump has reappropriated the term, and has 
accused reporters of publishing fake news to discredit legitimate stories when they are critical 
of his actions. See Tamara Keith, How Trump Tries to Discredit What He Doesn’t Like with 
‘Fake’ and ‘Phony’ Labels, NPR (Aug. 31, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/ 
08/31/643798637/how-trump-tries-to-discredit-what-he-doesnt-like-with-fake-and-phony-
labels [https://perma.cc/S5DU-M68Z].  Dictionary.com defines “fake news” as “false news 
stories, often of a sensational nature, created to be widely shared or distributed for the purpose 
of generating revenue, or promoting or discrediting a public figure, political movement, 
company, etc.” Fake News, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/fake-news 
[https://perma.cc/K42T-VHB8] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  This Note adopts 
Dictionary.com’s definition. 
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A.  Falsehoods:  Philosophical and Historical Context 
The value of protecting false speech has long been the subject of 
philosophical debate.  In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill defends false speech 
protections because he believes that false opinions enable people to ascertain 
the truth in free and open debate.5  Mill argues that ideological truth is not 
innately or universally known but must be unearthed through debate.  False 
opinions have value, Mill says, because they provoke people to investigate 
the proposition further, thereby leading to discovery of the truth.6  If 
misguided ideas are censored, discovery of truth will be stifled.7  Continuous 
debate requires people to defend and articulate the truth, thereby reinforcing 
its vigor.8  In this way, free speech can furnish a “clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”9 
In “On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns,”10 
Immanuel Kant examines the moral prohibitions against deliberate false 
speech:  lies.  Kant argues that all lies are harmful because they undermine 
others’ dignity by preventing them from acting freely and rationally.11  When 
speakers lie, they interfere with their listeners’ right to receive true 
information and manipulate their ability to make informed decisions based 
on fact.12  Furthermore, Kant argues that lies cause broader harm by 
undermining speakers’ credibility, which, in turn, causes people to distrust 
each other’s contentions.13  Together, Mill’s and Kant’s philosophies 
embrace both a right to communicate ideas and a right to receive information 
in open discourse. 
Drawing on earlier philosophers, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. enshrined the concept of the “marketplace of ideas” in 
American free speech principles.  He wrote, “[T]he ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”14  
Under this view, the free trade of ideas promotes a democratic system of 
governance by allowing people to discover the ultimate truth of what policies 
best serve society.  Encompassing the tenets of both Mill and Kant, the 
marketplace of ideas posits that individuals cannot expand their knowledge 
 
 5. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 5, 15, 18–54 (Mark Philip & Frederick Rosen eds., 2015). 
 6. Id. at 19–21, 35. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. at 35 (“[I]f [an idea] is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be 
held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”); see also Christoph Bezemek, The Epistemic 
Neutrality of the “Marketplace of Ideas”:  Milton, Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood 
and Freedom of Speech, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159, 166 (2015). 
 9. MILL, supra note 5, at 19. 
 10. Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, 
reprinted in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 162 (James W. Ellington trans., 2d ed. 1994). 
 11. See id. at 163–65. 
 12. Id.; Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment:  A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2006). 
 13. See Kant, supra note 10, at 163–64. 
 14. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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unless they can freely assert their ideas and test them against the ideas of 
others;15 a functional ideas marketplace presumes both that true ideas can be 
discovered and that participants in free discourse are trying to uncover the 
ultimate truth in good faith.16 
B.  Fake News’ Harmful Effects on Democratic Institutions 
and the Electorate 
James Madison wrote, “Public opinion sets bounds to every government, 
and is the real sovereign in every free one.”17  Because democratic 
government, in theory, must be responsive to public opinion,18 it is crucial 
that people have the means to form reasoned opinions about public policy.  
Traditionally, the news media enabled the public to form reasoned opinions 
that, in turn, informed government action and oversight.19  However, a 
growing fake news problem has accompanied the rise of social media and 
sensationalism of traditional media.  While newspaper readership has 
declined, the amount of information distributed online, including false 
information, has skyrocketed.20  The rise of social media has created a world 
where people are inundated with news, both legitimate and fake—a world 
that philosophers and scholars of the past never contemplated.  Because an 
informed public is vital to democratic self-governance, the rise of fake news 
presents unique problems to U.S. democracy. 
1.  Prevalence and Nature of Fake News 
The ease in spreading falsehoods creates a number of serious problems for 
democratic institutions.  Voters’ susceptibility to falsities undermines the 
ability of the electorate to choose qualified candidates for office.21  Kant’s 
objections to lies apply with greater force to the misinformation marketplace:  
fake news produces a “blanket of fog” that interferes with the electorate’s 
ability to make informed, rational decisions about candidates by “obscur[ing] 
 
 15. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM:  A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012). 
 16. Annie C. Hundley, Fake News and the First Amendment:  How False Political Speech 
Kills the Marketplace of Ideas, 92 TUL. L. REV. 497, 502–03 (2017).  Similar to Kant’s belief 
that people have a moral duty to tell the truth, Mill believed that people have a moral duty to 
assert only the opinions that they sincerely believe. MILL, supra note 5, at 21 (“It is the duty 
of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them 
carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right.”); see 
also SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS:  ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 141 
(2014). 
 17. For the National Gazette, [Ca. 19 December] 1791, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0145 [https://perma.cc/28EE-
86T2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 18. POST, supra note 15, at 14. 
 19. Id. at 35. 
 20. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 201 (2017). 
 21. Staci Lieffring, Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie:  Regulating Knowingly 
False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1064 (2013). 
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the real news and information communicated by campaigns.”22  Falsehoods 
about elections disrupt voter ability to choose a candidate who represents 
their interests, and they may also disincentivize voting entirely by confusing 
voters about polling locations, voting times, and voter eligibility.23 
Though political misinformation is not a new problem, the mass, targeted 
distribution of fake news on social media has disrupted the marketplace of 
ideas in entirely new and troubling ways.  Social media allows political actors 
to overwhelm users and disrupt their sense of reality by disseminating false 
news and political ads to an unprecedented degree at unprecedented speeds.24  
Because false stories are often more extreme or outrageous than true news, 
they are more likely to be shared on social media platforms.25  “Parasitic 
journalism”—the practice of reporting news produced by another source 
without additional investigation—can exacerbate this problem.26  A recent 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of Twitter found that “false 
stories diffused ‘farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all 
categories of information’” and that “[t]he truth, in other words, could not 
rise to the top [of the marketplace of ideas] because the marketplace was 
packed with lies.”27 
The ease in uploading and distributing online content means that fake news 
disguised as legitimate news spreads rapidly and reaches anywhere from 
hundreds to millions of viewers.28  On social media, political entities use ads 
or automated messages sent by bots to mass target specific demographics that 
are particularly susceptible to deceptive messages, possibly tricking many of 
these voters into voting against their interests.29 
The 2016 presidential election demonstrates the ways these techniques can 
be used to confuse and deceive on a massive scale.  Fake news spread rapidly 
during the 2016 election cycle; false pro-Trump articles were shared 30.3 
million times and false pro-Clinton articles were shared 7.6 million times on 
Facebook alone.30  A BuzzFeed analysis of top fake news stories during the 
campaigns found that the twenty most shared false stories—stories that 
originated from hoax websites or hyperpartisan blogs—generated more user 
 
 22. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 
69 (2017). 
 23. Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1064–65.  This disproportionately affects 
underrepresented populations, including women and minorities. Becky Kruse, The Truth in 
Masquerade:  Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads Through State Anti-False Speech 
Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 129, 143, 159 (2001). 
 24. See Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage, and Other Human Dispositions:  Reflections 
on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 48–49 (2018). 
 25. See Carol Pauli, “Fake News,” No News, and the Needs of Local Communities, 61 
HOW. L.J. 563, 575 (2018). 
 26. Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No Longer the Solution?  First Amendment 
Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 69 (2018). 
 27. Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 863 
(2018) (quoting Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 
SCIENCE 1146, 1147 (2018)). 
 28. Varat, supra note 24, at 48–49. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Hasen, supra note 20, at 208. 
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engagement than the top stories from major news outlets.31  These stories 
asserted false claims that Clinton sold weapons to ISIS, the pope endorsed 
Trump, and Clinton was disqualified from holding any federal office, among 
other outrageous falsehoods.32  One fake news author who wrote a false story 
claiming that thousands of fraudulent Clinton votes were found in an Ohio 
warehouse admitted that he made up the entire story and took only fifteen 
minutes to craft the viral piece that was ultimately seen by six million 
people.33 
Perhaps because stories with high shock value are more likely to become 
viral, political conspiracy theories have gained traction in recent years and 
have harmed individuals and businesses, as well as democratic institutions.  
The conspiracy theory that the Sandy Hook shooting was a fake story 
orchestrated by anti-gun lobbyists has led to harassment of victim’s 
families.34  The “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory that the Democratic Party was 
running a sex-trafficking ring out of a pizzeria led to the owner receiving 
death threats and a man firing a gun inside the restaurant.35  These 
conspiracies not only harmed specific entities, but also demonstrate the 
susceptibility of some Americans to fraudulent news, however absurd, and 
people’s growing distrust in their political opponents.  After “false flag” 
conspiracy theorists postulated that pipe bombs mailed to prominent 
Democrats were sent by other Democrats to make Republicans seem radical 
before the 2018 midterm election, New York Times writer Kevin Roose 
commented that “[c]onspiratorial thinking has always been with us—the 
grassy knoll, the moon landing, the Freemasons.  But it has been 
turbocharged . . . as cable news networks and pliant social media networks 
allow hastily assembled theories to spread to millions in an instant.”36 
The 2016 election also exposed the United States’s susceptibility to 
manipulation by foreign actors.  In 2016, Russian agents covertly influenced 
American voters in the presidential election with the goal of sowing distrust 
in the presidential candidates and American political system more 
generally.37  Russian agents used false reports and automated bots to target 
specific groups of people who were vulnerable to the deception, including 
 
 31. Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Election News Stories Outperformed 
Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-
outperformed-real-news-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/JV6F-QJPD]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Hundley, supra note 16, at 498–99. 
 34. David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 16 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 178, 181 (2017). 
 35. Cecilia Kang, Fake News Onslaught Targets Pizzeria as Nest of Child-Trafficking, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/technology/fact-check-
this-pizzeria-is-not-a-child-trafficking-site.html [https://perma.cc/JP9U-LZ3K]. 
 36. Kevin Roose, ‘False Flag’ Theory on Pipe Bombs Zooms from Right-Wing Fringe to 
Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/business/ 
false-flag-theory-bombs-conservative-media.html [https://perma.cc/M66U-TNL3]. 
 37. Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election:  Unraveling the Russia 
Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/ 
us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/9MZ8-DHD5]. 
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journalists who were likely to share the fake stories.38  The prevalence of bots 
on social media makes foreign interference even more troubling.  Between 
September 16 and October 21 of 2016, around 20 percent of all tweets about 
the election were generated by bots.39  It is impossible to know where these 
automated messages originated or who deployed them, demonstrating the 
vulnerability social media users have to foreign fake news content.40  A 
single Russian firm with fewer than a hundred agents generated content that 
reached around 150 million Facebook users on behalf of the Russian state.41 
2.  Decline in Legitimate Media 
Journalism adds value to society by providing factual information to 
people who then can make informed decisions and form reasoned opinions.  
Public policy professor Philip Napoli explains, “Journalism . . . produces 
value for society as a whole (positive externalities) that often is not captured 
in the economic transactions between news organizations and news 
consumers . . . .  [T]his leads to market inefficiency in the form of the 
underproduction of journalism . . . .”42  This inefficiency threatens an already 
declining market for legitimate news.43  Parasitic journalism furthers market 
inefficiency because republishers draw viewership and revenue away from 
legitimate sources that incur significant costs while producing high-quality 
news.44 
The prevalence of fake news also causes people to distrust and dispense 
with news more broadly.  Bots are often deployed to distribute the same false 
stories through diverse sources to trick readers by creating the perception that 
the fake news piece is more widely accepted than its true counterparts.45  This 
“flooding” technique can cause people to stop trusting the media entirely; the 
false-information overload means that people no longer know what to believe 
and eschew both credible and unreliable sources alike.46  Professor Seana 
Shiffrin explains that “deliberate misrepresentations undercut the warrants 
we have to accept each other’s testimonial speech, . . . interfer[ing] with the 
aims of free speech culture.”47  Repeated falsehoods in the media work 
similarly by undermining viewers’ confidence in news as a source of factual 
information.  The problem is exacerbated by social media companies that 
 
 38. Hasen, supra note 20, at 206–07. 
 39. Persily, supra note 22, at 70. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-
zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/558E-ZCES]. 
 42. Napoli, supra note 26, at 89–90. 
 43. Hasen, supra note 20, at 203. 
 44. Napoli, supra note 26, at 69–70. 
 45. Fighting Fake News, YALE L. SCH. 5, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/ 
isp/documents/fighting_fake_news_-_workshop_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2U9-PSBL] 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  This tactic is so powerful it has even caused certain fake stories 
to “trend” on social media. Id. 
 46. Varat, supra note 24, at 48–49. 
 47. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 117. 
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cater news to their viewers.  Technology allows these companies to use 
algorithms to promote content they believe their viewers will like, which 
creates echo chambers where users are exposed to the same information 
repeatedly, without exposure to contradicting sources.48 
Use of traditional media sources has already declined sharply in the 
internet age, and distrust in such sources will likely contribute to the 
continuance of this troubling trend.49  Fake news has already caused 
confusion and distrust by flooding the news marketplace with falsehoods.  In 
a recent Gallup poll surveying Americans’ beliefs about the prevalence of 
false news, on average respondents said that 39 percent of the news they see 
on traditional news media is misinformation.50  In another poll, 58 percent of 
respondents reported that the increase in news sources makes it harder to be 
well-informed.51  These statistics demonstrate the growing trends of distrust 
and confusion that result from the misinformation marketplace. 
Distrust in traditional media harms the press’s role as a stabilizing 
democratic institution.52  If people lose trust in traditional media because of 
fake news, the press will be unable to serve its watchdog role as a check on 
government.  Because government accountability is largely motivated by a 
watchful press, a decline in coverage or consumption could result in greater 
corruption.53  Americans are already skeptical of the media.  Although 
84 percent of polled Americans agree that news media is “critical” or “very 
important” to democracy, only 28 percent reported that it supports 
democracy “well” or “very well.”54 
A decline in traditional news media in favor of social media may also harm 
democracy by allowing fake news propagated by politicians and their 
supporters to flourish unchecked, which could potentially lead to higher 
 
 48. Fighting Fake News, supra note 45, at 4. 
 49. Hasen, supra note 20, at 202–03. 
 50. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans:  Much Misinformation, Bias, Inaccuracy in News, 
GALLUP (June 20, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/235796/americans-
misinformation-bias-inaccuracy-news.aspx [https://perma.cc/6AJ8-BJA4].  In this poll, 
traditional media included TV, radio, and newspapers. Id.  Respondents reported that they 
believe 65 percent of news they see on social media is misinformation. Id.  In 2016, Gallup 
reported that only 32 percent of Americans responded that they trusted the mass media “to 
report the news fully, accurately and fairly,” in contrast with a peak level of confidence at 
72 percent in 1976, following coverage of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Art 
Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9AQW-W2Z5]. 
 51. Jeffrey M. Jones & Zacc Ritter, Americans Struggle to Navigate the Modern Media 
Landscape, GALLUP (Jan. 23, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/226157/americans-
struggle-navigate-modern-media-landscape.aspx [https://perma.cc/NV6T-LAZR]. 
 52. Hasen, supra note 20, at 201–05. 
 53. Id. at 209–10 (explaining that higher levels of corruption in state and local 
governments are directly correlated with newspaper coverage of those governments). 
 54. Zacc Ritter & Jeffrey M. Jones, Media Seen as Key to Democracy but Not Supporting 
It Well, GALLUP (Jan. 16, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/225470/media-seen-key-
democracy-not-supporting.aspx [https://perma.cc/459P-T8GY].  An additional 27 percent of 
people agreed that the news media is performing “acceptably” in supporting democracy. Id. 
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levels of political corruption.55  While traditional news organizations once 
served as intermediaries between the government and people, with “the 
fostering of a well-informed and civically minded electorate” as their primary 
purpose, now, social media organizations have overtaken the intermediary 
role.56  But, unlike traditional news organizations, social media networks do 
not have a principal purpose of safeguarding democracy or enabling truth-
seeking in the ideas marketplace.57 
Furthermore, while political candidates and leaders in the past could 
communicate with constituents only through TV, radio, and newspapers, they 
now can reach the public directly through social media.  Provocateurs can 
use Twitter and Facebook to spread false messages and inflammatory 
comments without filtration by legitimate media sources, which have 
historically corrected fallacious and exaggerated claims.58  Without 
legitimate news as a necessary intermediary, the government has a greater 
ability to use false speech for nefarious purposes.59  Political leaders can use 
false speech to discredit their critics, manipulate public opinion, or distract 
the public from investigating government activities.60  In November, the 
White House tweeted a doctored video involving an altercation between a 
CNN reporter often critical of the president and a White House intern to 
legitimize its revocation of the reporter’s press pass.61  Just two days before 
the 2018 midterm elections, gubernatorial candidate Brian Kemp, who was 
also Georgia’s secretary of state at the time, claimed without evidence that 
Democrats tried to hack Georgia’s voter registration files amidst claims that 
he was trying to suppress the minority vote to win his race.62 
Fake news undermines democracy by inhibiting voters’ ability to make 
informed political decisions and sowing distrust in legitimate media.  
Because fake news is easy to produce and free to distribute on a wide scale, 
the problem is unlikely to go away on its own. 
 
 55. Hasen, supra note 20, at 209. 
 56. Persily, supra note 22, at 74. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Hasen, supra note 20, at 212–14. 
 59. See generally Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 342 (2017). 
 60. Id. at 355. 
 61. Lukas I. Alpert & Rebecca Ballhaus, White House Posted Video That Exaggerated 
Incident with CNN Reporter, Social-Media Firm Says, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-accused-of-posting-edited-video-that-
exaggerated-incident-involving-cnn-reporter-1541703579 [https://perma.cc/E2WD-2GJ2]. 
 62. See Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Brian Kemp’s Office, Without Citing Evidence, 
Investigates Georgia Democrats over Alleged ‘Hack,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/georgia-elections-kemp-voters-hack.html 
[https://perma.cc/2G9L-QDWN].  Kemp did not use social media to make this announcement, 
so legitimate media—acting as intermediary between Kemp’s office and the public—was able 
to qualify his claims of hacking by saying that they were unsubstantiated. See id. 
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II.  FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR FALSE SPEECH 
Although fake news presents a number of threats to democracy, it is 
protected by the First Amendment.  This Part examines constitutional 
protections for false speech.  Part II.A explains the purpose of the First 
Amendment and describes how false speech has been deemed valueless, yet 
still worthy of protection by the Supreme Court.  Part II.B analyzes United 
States v. Alvarez,63 a case that struck down a statute that criminalized false 
statements about receipt of military honors, to demonstrate the numerous 
ways that the First Amendment protects false speech.  Finally, Part II.C 
discusses the ways in which First Amendment protections incorporate the 
philosophical theories, described in Part I.A, that underpin free speech 
values. 
A.  Constitutional Background 
Because an informed public is crucial to democratic self-governance, a 
primary purpose of the First Amendment is to protect public debate, the 
means through which public opinion develops.64  U.S. democracy “depends 
on [the public’s] joint engagement with and evaluation of competing 
visions.”65  The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any law 
“abridging the freedom of speech”66 because public opinion is formed 
through free and open discourse.  Encompassing Millian principles, this 
broad protection ensures that “everything worth saying shall be said” so that 
knowledge can grow free from government suppression and people can assert 
their collective will over their leaders.67  But, to ensure that free speech is 
safeguarded, some things not worth saying, such as falsehoods, receive 
incidental protection.68 
Understanding First Amendment protections for false speech requires 
knowing what constitutes a false statement of fact.  In Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co.,69 the Court held that, if a reasonable factfinder would conclude 
that an expression of opinion implies a piece of information that is 
“sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false,” it is a 
statement of fact.70 
 
 63. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 64. POST, supra note 15, at 14. 
 65. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 
1160 (2003). 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 67. See POST, supra note 15, at 14–16. 
 68. Shiffrin, supra note 65, at 1160 (“We want speakers to have full freedom in the 
construction and dissemination of their intent.  [Democratic] legitimacy depends on it.  
Protection of the bitter alongside the sweet, then, may be a necessary condition of protecting 
those valuable processes and outcomes provoked by insightful speech.”). 
 69. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 70. See id. at 21. 
2634 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
The Court has oft repeated that false statements of fact have no 
constitutional value.71  In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,72 the Court 
noted that “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they 
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”73  In 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,74 the Court reiterated that no false statement has 
constitutional value because “[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless 
error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open’ debate on public issues.”75  However, the Court noted that while 
constitutionally valueless, some falsehoods require First Amendment 
protection to ensure that the ideas marketplace flourishes.76  These 
protections for false speech, explained in Parts II.B and II.C, protect the 
creation and distribution of fake news. 
B.  United States v. Alvarez 
While fake news presents serious threats to democratic institutions, First 
Amendment jurisprudence raises substantial obstacles to regulation.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez demonstrates the constitutional 
conflicts that arise from false speech prohibitions.77  In Alvarez, the Court 
struck down the Stolen Valor Act, a law that criminalized stated falsehoods 
about receiving military honors.78  The plurality articulated two 
justifications.  First, the Act could not be justified because the government 
failed to demonstrate that false claims of military valor caused provable 
harm.79  In defending the Act, the government asserted that it was common 
 
 71. Though the Court has stated this in absolute terms, it has, at other times, noted various 
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human objectives, for example:  in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, 
protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a 
child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm 
in the face of danger . . . .”). 
 72. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 73. Id. at 52.  The Court, however, distinguished between believable falsehoods and 
falsehoods that the public would not reasonably believe, like parodies, which have 
constitutional importance as instruments used to critique public officials and figures. Id. at 50, 
54. 
 74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 75. Id. at 340 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 76. Id. at 340–41. 
 77. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 78. Id. at 730 (plurality opinion).  The statute read, “Whoever falsely represents himself 
or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by 
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, 
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broadly criminalized false representations, the Court read a scienter requirement into the 
statute. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725–26 (plurality opinion) (discussing the harms caused by 
lies by “pretenders”); id. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[The statute] may 
be construed to prohibit only knowing and intentional acts of deception about readily 
verifiable facts within the personal knowledge of the speaker . . . .”). 
 79. Id. at 725–26 (plurality opinion). 
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knowledge that an aggregate of misrepresentations about military honors 
would dilute the value of the awards.80  The Court, concerned about 
establishing a precedent that would permit the government to restrict false 
speech without any showing of palpable harm, struck down the statute.81  The 
concurring justices agreed that the Act could be written more narrowly to 
require a showing of specific or material harm, which would “help to make 
certain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability . . . to roam at large, 
discouraging or forbidding the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is 
unlikely or the need for the prohibition is small.”82 
Second, the plurality worried that the Act would create a dangerous 
precedent for overly broad regulation of lies without a judicial backstop.83  
The Alvarez plurality took issue with the fact that the Stolen Valor Act 
applied to virtually all false statements about military valor without regard to 
time, location, audience, or purpose and noted that it applied equally to false 
claims made in public and to “personal, whispered conversations within a 
home.”84  The Court’s fear was primarily one of second order.  The plurality 
opinion was not concerned with the protection of false speech but rather with 
the ability of the government to declare entire categories of false speech 
unconstitutional.85  The Court feared that it would not be able to draw lines 
about which categories of false speech are constitutionally regulable when 
these laws are challenged.86  The Court noted that: 
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense, 
whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper, 
would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about 
which false statements are punishable.  That governmental power has no 
clear limiting principle.  Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea 
that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.87 
Granting the government a “broad censorial power” to regulate falsehoods, 
the Court continued, would chill true speech because people would fear 
selective prosecution.88  Avoiding a potential slippery slope where any 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id.  The dissenting justices found that false claims about military service had 
caused tangible harm and noted that, in one region of the United States, “12 men defrauded 
the Department of Veterans Affairs out of more than $1.4 million in veteran’s benefits.” Id. at 
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 82. Id. at 736, 738 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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 84. Id. at 722–23. 
 85. Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform:  Walker v. Texas Division, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 337, 383 (2016). 
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category of false speech could be regulated, including those that invite 
potential for government abuses of power, the Court erred on the side of 
caution and found it impermissible for the government to restrict any 
falsehoods unconnected with a provable harm.89 
The Alvarez Court left open the question of what standard of scrutiny 
should be applied to false speech regulations.  The plurality analyzed the 
Stolen Valor Act—a content-based regulation that distinguished between 
speech about military honors and all other speech—under a “most exacting 
scrutiny” standard, which requires that the statute be actually necessary to 
achieve a compelling government interest.90  In contrast, the concurrence 
applied a “proportionality review” standard, which weighs the regulation’s 
harm to free speech against the regulation’s justifications.91  The concurrence 
chose this intermediate scrutiny standard of review because the restriction 
did not present a “grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful 
speech” as it concerned only false statements about “easily verifiable 
facts.”92 
The Supreme Court has not defined the standard of review applicable to 
general false speech restrictions—one not limited to a particular topic.  Such 
a standard would likely hinge on whether a regulation on all false statements 
of fact would be considered content-based.  In Police Department v. 
Mosley,93 the Supreme Court outlined two types of content-based speech 
regulation:  regulation based on viewpoint and regulation based on subject 
matter.94  Viewpoint-based regulations involve restrictions that favor one 
opinion over another, while subject-matter-based regulations involve 
restrictions on certain topics, regardless of the viewpoints being expressed.95 
However, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,96 the Court held that strict scrutiny 
must be applied to any content-based speech regulation and that a regulation 
is content-based if it makes distinctions based on the speaker’s message on 
its face or if it “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.’”97  Under this rule, lies could be regulated under a lesser 
standard based on the speaker’s intent to deceive rather than the content of 
his message.98  For example, if two speakers made identical false statements, 
one in error and the other in malice, the latter could be prosecuted without 
strict scrutiny review because malicious intent to deceive, not the content of 
his words, would subject him to liability.  But, because any prohibition on all 
falsehoods—whether made erroneously or deceitfully—would refer to the 
 
 89. See id.; see also Greene, supra note 85, at 383. 
 90. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724–25 (plurality opinion). 
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 96. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 97. Id. at 2222 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 98. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 126, 132. 
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false content of the speech, any restriction would almost certainly be subject 
to strict scrutiny.99 
Assuming the Court would apply strict scrutiny, it would require a false 
speech regulation to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest.100  In Alvarez, the Court held that the protection of the 
integrity of military awards was a compelling government interest but that 
the statute could not be upheld because there were less restrictive alternatives 
to achieving that goal.101  There, both the plurality and the concurrence 
agreed that true counterspeech is an adequate remedy to false speech.102  
Drawing on Millian principles, Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted, “The 
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the ordinary 
course in a free society.  The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to 
the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”103  
Chastising the Stolen Valor Act as paternalistic, Justice Kennedy declared 
that “[o]nly a weak society needs government protection or intervention 
before it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth.  Truth needs neither 
handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”104 
The requirement that a false speech regulation be narrowly tailored to the 
compelling government interest it purports to serve presents a major obstacle 
to enacting such a regulation because “[n]o legislature could ever draft a 
statute that invades an individual’s freedom of speech rights less than 
allowing for discourse to blossom and thrive in free and open debate.”105  To 
survive strict scrutiny review, “[t]he final constitutional hinge, therefore, 
swings upon the effectiveness of truth.”106 
C.  Understanding False Speech Regulations from Two Perspectives 
Though strict scrutiny review makes false speech regulation difficult, there 
are a number of laws that constitutionally restrict false speech.  In Alvarez, 
the concurring justices stated that “many statutes and common-law doctrines 
make the utterance of certain kinds of false statements unlawful.”107  Such 
statutes do not suffer from the same constitutional defects as the Stolen Valor 
Act, which lacked a provable-harm requirement and failed to establish any 
limiting principle.108  Justice Breyer described several speech restrictions 
that are permissible, including defamation and intentional infliction of 
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emotional distress torts; consumer fraud and perjury statutes; and statutes that 
bar false claims about terrorist attacks or other disasters.109  Regulations 
narrowing the scope of liability do so in three general ways:  (1) “by requiring 
proof of specific harm to identifiable victims”; (2) “by specifying that the lies 
be made in contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to 
occur”; and (3) “by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are particularly 
likely to produce harm.”110 
Defamation, consumer protection, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress laws fall into the first category of requiring specific proof of harm 
and cover reputational, economic, physical, emotional, and privacy harms to 
individuals.111  Perjury is an example of a prohibition in the second category, 
as falsehoods in a courtroom are particularly likely to harm one party’s 
liberty or property unjustly, in addition to harming the functionality of the 
judicial system.112  Prohibitions on falsehoods about terrorist attacks are in 
the third category, as they limit a narrow topic that is particularly likely to 
produce public harms like panic.113 
There are additional ways the law describes false speech protections.  High 
barriers for false speech liability can be understood as protecting speakers, 
while the regulations themselves may be understood as protecting listeners.  
Part II.A.1 explores the “actual malice” standard, which shields speakers 
from liability for many false claims.  Part II.A.2 then analyzes certain false-
claims regulations under a listener-based approach that seeks to shield 
listeners from fallacious information. 
1.  Millian Protections for Speakers 
The Supreme Court has safeguarded false claims by requiring a high mens 
rea standard for liability.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan114—one of the 
inaugural cases regarding First Amendment protections for false political 
speech—the Court found that defendants can only be required to pay 
damages to a public official for libel if a plaintiff proves that the false 
statement was published with “actual malice,” that is, knowledge that the 
claim was false or with reckless disregard as to whether the statement was 
false.115  The Sullivan Court shared the same second-order concerns that the 
Alvarez Court raised nearly fifty years later—that fear of liability for false 
speech without significant barriers for plaintiffs to overcome would chill true 
speech by “dampen[ing] the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most 
irresponsible,” speakers.116  In this way, Sullivan protects speakers from 
limitless liability over inadvertent false claims, and recognizes that the 
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“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate.”117  The Court emphasized 
that protecting speakers, even at a cost to others, is fundamental to preserving 
open discourse.118  In a later defamation case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
the Court explained that Sullivan recognized a strict liability standard but that 
requiring defendants to warrant that every published statement was accurate 
to defend against liability would result in “intolerable self-censorship.”119  
Defendants, fearing expensive litigation costs and damages awards, would 
be unable to make any assertions absent personal knowledge of their truth.120  
This approach draws on the Millian principle that laws should enable 
speakers to engage in free debate and should eliminate barriers to such 
participation.121 
Since Sullivan, “actual malice” has been considered a quintessential 
element of liability for false claims.  In Alvarez, the plurality reaffirmed that 
“falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First 
Amendment” and that “[t]he statement must be a knowing or reckless 
falsehood” for a court to impose money damages or criminal liability.122  
Because actual malice is difficult to prove, this precedent often allows 
speakers to make harmful false claims with impunity. 
Gertz left open the possibility of more restrictive false speech laws.  While 
an actual malice standard is required to impose liability for defamation 
targeting a public official, the Gertz Court held that a negligence standard 
may apply in cases brought by private individuals provided that they can 
prove actual injury.123  The Court reasoned that private persons, as compared 
with public figures, have less access to channels of communication that 
would allow them to correct lies and falsehoods and are therefore less able to 
mitigate resulting reputational harms.124  Because private persons are more 
susceptible to these harms, the state has a greater interest in protecting private 
individuals than it does in protecting public figures.125  Gertz ties the 
ineffectiveness of true counterspeech and resulting harm to the state’s 
latitude in restricting speech. 
2.  Kantian Protections for Listeners 
Though not directly addressed by the Alvarez plurality, the government 
may constitutionally regulate falsehoods by looking to the effect on listeners.  
Inherent in the conception of the marketplace of ideas is the ability of people 
to rely on factual assertions to form reasoned opinions.  Freedom of opinion 
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cannot exist without a factual basis for those opinions because “factual truth 
informs political thought.”126  Protections for listeners are essential to enable 
their participation in democratic discourse.127  Although Kant objected 
specifically to lies, his reasoning can be extrapolated to falsehoods more 
generally.  From the listener’s perspective, a lie is indistinguishable from an 
error, but both inhibit her right to receive information and her ability to 
develop informed opinions. 
Under a listener-based approach, listeners’ interests in receiving accurate 
information are placed above speakers’ interests in speaking freely when 
there is a power imbalance or unequal access to information.128  This 
approach can be “characterized as involving those circumstances in which 
speakers have special access to (or special authority about) information, 
rendering listeners reliant on speakers’ testimony because they cannot easily 
or readily verify what is said in another way.”129  This inequality occurs when 
speakers create information or hold a monopoly over information.130 
Of the false claims regulations discussed by the Alvarez concurrence, 
consumer fraud and perjury exemplify where a listener-based approach 
justifies the speech restrictions.  Consumer protection statutes recognize that 
commercial actors have far more information about their products and 
services than consumers.131  Because of this informational imbalance, 
consumers rely on commercial actors’ statements when deciding what to 
purchase as they often cannot distinguish between high and low value 
products or services.132  Consumers’ inability to determine whether a 
commercial actor’s claims are true renders them particularly vulnerable to 
deception, manipulation, and harm resulting from false claims, whether made 
deceptively or mistakenly.133 
Perjury statutes similarly consider inequalities of information between 
speakers and their listeners.  Judges, juries, and other government actors rely 
on the statements made by people under oath to properly administer justice.  
Often, those testifying have a monopoly over the information sought, which 
underscores the importance of protections for listeners who rely on the truth 
of speakers’ testimony in making important determinations. 
Where the actual malice standard invokes a Millian approach to false 
speech regulation by favoring speakers, a listener-based approach is more 
Kantian, and recognizes that falsehoods interfere with listeners’ abilities to 
freely make rational, informed decisions.134  Though both ways of 
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understanding false speech prohibitions emphasize actual injury or potential 
harm, Sullivan and Gertz made clear that mens rea is required for liability.  
This requirement means that there is currently a dearth of legal remedies for 
some forms of false speech that result in considerable harm. 
III.  IS FAKE NEWS REGULATION COMPATIBLE WITH THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT? 
Because fake news is created easily, dispersed rapidly, and consumed in 
massive quantities, it is likely to persist absent regulation.  Scholars, 
legislators, and others have already set forth a number of proposals that aim 
to combat the fake news problem.  Part III.A analyzes proposed solutions to 
the fake news problem both practically and constitutionally, and Part III.B 
debates whether a speech-restrictive regulation would realistically fit into the 
First Amendment jurisprudence described in Part II. 
A.  Inadequacy of Already-Proposed Solutions 
In this Part, this Note examines why proposed solutions to the fake news 
problem are inadequate in fighting false news.  Part III.A.1 explains why 
proposals that do not restrict false speech are unlikely to have a major effect 
on the false news market, while Part III.B describes the ways proposed false 
speech restrictions would fail strict scrutiny review. 
1.  Non-Speech-Restrictive Proposed Remedies Are Inadequate 
While remedies that do not restrict speech on the basis of falsity would 
almost certainly survive a constitutional challenge, they are unlikely to have 
a major effect on fake news.  Some have suggested that the harms caused by 
fake news can be alleviated with educational programs devoted to media 
literacy or increased academic emphasis on the importance of fact-
checking.135  Such programs could encourage skepticism toward online news 
content and teach people to critically analyze its accuracy.136  But efforts to 
educate people about the importance of fact-checking are unlikely to work 
because news consumers are already aware of the prevalence of 
misinformation in the news.137  Furthermore, efforts to educate people to 
more readily tell when a story is false would probably fail because readers 
are flooded with the same fake news from many different sources, which 
often outnumber their legitimate counterparts, making fact-checking an 
onerous and confusing process.138 
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Others have floated the idea of an ethics code for political candidates to 
encourage honesty in campaigns.139  Candidates who pledge to uphold a code 
of ethics would either self-enforce or voluntarily subject themselves to ethics 
determinations by a self-appointed body.140  Such an ethics code would 
similarly fail to provide an adequate fake news remedy because, although 
some fake news originates from leaders or candidates themselves, many false 
stories about elections are created by third parties.141  Further, candidates 
who already use their speech platforms to spew falsehoods would have little 
incentive to pledge to uphold a campaign ethics code, particularly one that 
has no enforcement mechanism.142 
A number of legal scholars agree that amending § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA),143 which immunizes online content 
providers from liability for unlawful user-generated content, would be a 
prudent way to affect the ways in which online content is published and 
distributed.144  Where print republishers of tortious or criminal speech would 
be subject to liability, social media companies enjoy total immunity under 
the CDA, even when their platforms are designed to encourage users to post 
illegal content.145  A modified § 230 could shield social media services from 
liability only if they take reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful 
content posted by their users.146  The threat of civil liability might alleviate 
the fake news problem by incentivizing online content providers to remove 
false, defamatory stories.147  Amending § 230 of the CDA to limit immunity 
currently enjoyed by social media companies that actively encourage or 
passively permit unlawful speech on their platforms would be a good start to 
fighting the fake news problem. 
Originally, § 230 was designed to encourage internet publishers to take 
good faith measures to regulate their content, without liability for either 
underscreening or overscreening content in efforts to filter unlawful, illegal, 
or otherwise objectionable content.148  An amendment requiring these 
companies to take reasonable efforts to screen and remove unlawful content 
would revitalize § 230’s original goal by creating statutory incentives for 
republishers to undertake remedial efforts to remove criminal or tortious 
speech on their platforms for fear of republisher liability.149  Good faith 
 
 139. See Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1069. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 142. See Lieffring, supra note 21, at 1068. 
 143. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 144. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage:  
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 453–55 (2018). 
 145. Id. at 455–56; Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Monsanto Lecture:  Online Defamation, 
Legal Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2016). 
 146. Citron & Wittes, supra note 144, at 471. 
 147. Joel Timmer, Fighting Falsity:  Fake News, Facebook, and the First Amendment, 35 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 669, 687 (2017). 
 148. Citron & Wittes, supra note 144, at 457–58. 
 149. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:  Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 420 (2017). 
2019] MANAGING THE MISINFORMATION MARKETPLACE 2643 
requirements to censor content implicate fake news because they would 
compel online publishers to remove reported defamatory speech.  These 
publishers would be incentivized to discourage users from posting such 
speech in the first instance.  Because online platforms can build their sites in 
ways that protect both privacy and expression,150 reasonableness 
requirements, coupled with the overscreening protections that already exist, 
could plausibly encourage social media firms to develop ways to block bots 
or known hoax websites from posting content. 
However, it is doubtful that amending § 230 alone would eliminate fake 
news distribution online.  Though fear of expensive litigation might be 
enough to persuade social media companies to remove defamatory content 
after users report it, the actual malice requirement presents an obstacle.  In 
practice, only sizeable private actors with substantial financial resources 
would initiate lawsuits against a social media giant because proving malice 
is so difficult.  Moreover, current tort law limits the power of a CDA revision 
to stop fake news that is not defamatory:  while false speech that harms 
specific individuals would subject republishers to liability, falsehoods 
creating general harm are currently unactionable.151  Fake news that causes 
harm by distorting election issues or creating conspiracy theories is not 
covered by current law, so an amended § 230 would do nothing to compel 
online entities to block such content. 
Another idea targeting online publishers directly is to enact source-
disclosure requirements for online advertisements.152  This type of law would 
require hosts of paid third-party content to provide viewers with information 
about their sponsors.153  Much like the commercial sponsorship identification 
laws that already regulate broadcast media, disclosure requirements for paid 
online content might enable viewers to make more accurate inferences about 
its truth.154  Online social media users seeing paid content could better assess 
“where information is coming from, what values it might be representing, 
[and] whose interests it might be serving” if they had more information about 
its sponsors.155 
Though useful, disclosure requirements for paid online advertisements 
alone would fail to provide a full remedy to the fake news problem.  Although 
information about content sources would help viewers make better inferences 
about content’s validity,156 the fake news stories that spread broadly and 
rapidly across social media are often unpaid content.157  Sponsorship 
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disclosures could potentially prevent manipulation by foreign actors using 
paid content to influence elections but would otherwise have little effect.  
Furthermore, protections for anonymous speech are strong,158 and it is 
unclear whether this kind of requirement would survive a constitutional 
challenge. 
2.  Speech-Restrictive Proposed Remedies Are Unconstitutional 
While the proposals outlined above seek to remedy the fake news problem 
by addressing its effects or the forums where it is dispersed, others aim to 
restrict the false speech itself.  Some states have sought to address the 
harmful effects fake news has on democracy by restricting false speech 
surrounding elections.159  Bans on false paid political advertisements or 
campaign materials have been advanced as a potential solution to the fake 
news problem and have been enacted in several states.160  One proposed law 
would prohibit campaign slander.161  Another would deter false speech about 
ballot initiatives by imposing criminal punishments.162  Another speech-
restrictive idea is a proposed ban on false speech concerning election 
administration, such as falsehoods about the time, place, or manner of 
voting.163  These types of laws would aim to protect voters from 
manipulation that would otherwise depress voter turnout.164 
These proposed restrictions on false speech are unworkable in the context 
of fighting fake news because they are powerless to stop its circulation and 
are vulnerable to constitutional challenges as they fall outside the First 
Amendment framework described above in Part II.  Bans on false political 
advertisements, already enacted in several states, are similar to proposals for 
source disclosures in paid political advertisements in that they are insufficient 
to remedy the harms caused by fake news.  As stated above, the fake news 
problem is not largely concerned with false advertising because false stories 
usually come in the form of unpaid content that is disguised as real news.165  
False political advertising bans have included malice or a specific intent 
standard, which makes it difficult to hold its creators legally accountable.166  
The ultimate downfall of these statutes, though, is their imposition of 
criminal liability.167  Alvarez was clear that criminal liability for false 
political speech is impermissible because of the potential for government 
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abuse.168  The looming threat of criminal sanctions on speakers using paid 
advertisements to convey political messages—particularly those without a 
demonstrated material harm—would chill true speech and therefore fail a 
constitutional challenge.  Thus far, courts have struck down these statutes in 
states where challenges have been brought.169 
Likewise, false election speech statutes will likely meet a similar 
constitutional demise.  Criminalizing malicious and false political speech, 
including falsehoods about ballot measures or matters of election 
administration, is unconstitutional under an Alvarez analysis because it 
would give the government leverage to prosecute only its critics,170 though a 
demonstrated material harm to listeners might save these statutes from 
judicial nullification.171  Even so, false claims about ballot initiatives and 
election administration are only a small part of the problem; a false speech 
restriction would need to apply far more broadly to fight fake news. 
Some of the proposals outlined in this section—like amending the CDA, 
enacting disclosure requirements for online advertisements, and prohibiting 
false election speech where constitutionally permissible—should be enacted 
because they provide a partial remedy for the fake news problem.  But 
scholars’ inability to come up with a constitutionally permissible and 
complete remedy invites the question:  Is it possible to directly regulate fake 
news given the powerful First Amendment protections for free speech? 
B.  Inability to Restrict Fake News Directly 
The strict confines of Alvarez leave little room for fake news regulation.  
In Alvarez, the Stolen Valor Act ultimately failed because the government 
believed that false speech about military honors was less troublesome than a 
“Ministry of Truth” regulating falsehoods.172  Regulating fake news, then, 
involves “choosing the lesser evil” between the harms caused by false speech 
and the chilling effects restrictions might produce.173  So, a regulation is more 
likely to pass constitutional muster where the harms caused by fake news are 
“particularly acute and where the risk of government abuse is significantly 
limited in some manner.”174 
Because the maliciously deceitful and carelessly erroneous publishers of 
fake news are indistinguishable to viewers and cause the same confusion and 
distrust, a viable fake news remedy must address all falsehoods in the news.  
A fake news regulation restricting speech on the basis of its falsity would be 
subject to strict scrutiny review.  The Supreme Court acknowledges that “it 
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is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny,”175 
but there are a number of false speech restrictions, described in Part II.B, that 
have survived this review.176  The state has many compelling interests that 
would justify regulation, including ensuring that voters choose qualified 
candidates, protecting voters from fraud that might otherwise prevent them 
from voting, shielding elections from foreign interference, maintaining a 
strong press as a check on government corruption, and preserving a lively 
ideas marketplace, all of which are threatened by fake news.177  To meet strict 
scrutiny, then, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve those compelling 
state interests.  As stated earlier, true counterspeech is a less restrictive 
remedy, so the constitutionality of a false speech restriction would depend on 
the efficacy of truth. 
The Alvarez Court overestimated the power of true counterspeech.  
Although the plurality and concurrence in Alvarez both noted that the Stolen 
Valor Act was not narrowly tailored because there was an available remedy 
less restrictive than a criminal statute—creating a database of those awarded 
military honors—their assertion that true counterspeech is an effective 
remedy is misguided.178  Justice Kennedy fortifies his defense of the truth as 
an effective remedy by citing to Justice Holmes’s conception of the 
marketplace of ideas:  “The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.’”179  But this mischaracterizes the ideas marketplace:  it is the 
free trade of ideas, not facts, that enriches debate and allows the public to 
make informed voting decisions.180  The concurring justices, too, 
misunderstood both Justice Holmes and Mill when contending that false 
statements of fact add value to political debate.181  The reasoning underlying 
the Court’s defense of true counterspeech as an adequate remedy to false 
speech is not only predicated on misinterpreted philosophical theories, but it 
also ignores the problem that, in a marketplace of facts, the truth does not 
always prevail.182 
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True counterspeech has proven an ineffective remedy to fake news 
because people do not “buy” more truth than false news.  While free 
exchange of ideas might lead to discovery of ideological “truth” as Mill once 
contemplated,183 free exchange of facts obscures it.  Because fake news 
appears to be true, targets people susceptible to deception, and spreads more 
widely than legitimate news, true counterspeech is powerless in the facts 
marketplace:  How can truth prevail over falsehoods when people cannot 
distinguish one from the other?  The counterspeech doctrine fails to address 
the ways that technological advancements have affected news consumption 
and that psychological predispositions cause people to hold onto incorrect 
beliefs, even when presented with evidence to the contrary.184  Much like in 
a marketplace of goods, a marketplace of facts might persuade viewers to 
“buy” information “packaged” in ways that appeal to their superficial 
preferences rather than the information’s actual value.185  In fact, a wealth of 
scientific evidence indicates that many factors wholly unrelated to the quality 
of information affect which statements of fact people “buy” in the 
information marketplace.186  The marketplace of ideas metaphor is also a 
flawed way of understanding free speech because of its inherent assumption 
that participants are seeking to find “truth” in good faith.187  In reality, many 
bad faith self-interested speakers promote ideas for personal gain rather than 
to benefit the public good.  These inefficiencies, much like in economic 
markets, lead to market failure in the ideas marketplace. 
Moreover, true counterspeech fails to address other harms caused by fake 
news.  In justifying the counterspeech doctrine, the Alvarez Court failed to 
consider the ways that protections for listeners further the goals of the ideas 
marketplace—namely, to enable the public to form reasoned opinions in a 
democratic society.  Because false stories undermine readers’ basis for trust 
and reliance on news,188 the unchecked distribution of false stories online 
will continue to cause distrust in the media.  Counterspeech cannot restore 
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readers’ trust and confidence in the news.  A failure to address this problem 
allows the decline in traditional media to continue, thereby decreasing its 
power as a check on government.189  Because true counterspeech has failed 
to prevent widespread deception and distrust, a more restrictive alternative is 
constitutionally permissible. 
In theory, a statute could be narrowly tailored by limiting liability in a 
number of ways that would prevent government abuse.  A regulation might 
require a showing of material harm.190  In Alvarez, the Court found that while 
the aggregate of lies about military honors may dilute their value, a single lie 
may not have a significant harmful effect.191  Similarly, while every piece of 
fake news contributes to broad harms to democracy, not every false story 
causes significant harm.  A fake news restriction might be limited to false 
stories that generate a particular amount of engagement on social media 
under a presumption that a certain number of likes, shares, or comments 
evidences significant disruption of political speech. 
A regulation might also be narrowed in scope by limiting liability based 
on time or forum.  In 2016, fake news was particularly prevalent during the 
final three months of the presidential campaign,192 so false speech 
restrictions might be confined to the months before major elections.  Because 
errors are unavoidable in open discourse,193 only published false statements 
could be restricted.  Beyond this, the forums might be limited to social media 
platforms or websites with a certain number of subscribers. 
Though a fake news regulation might square with the Alvarez 
understanding of the First Amendment in theory, practical concerns make it 
highly unlikely that any restriction on fake news would be both constitutional 
and effective.  Imposing civil or criminal liability on fake news publishers 
would require a finding of actual malice, which would be impracticable for 
fake news shared by many unknown sources online.  In the abstract, a statute 
could avoid the actual malice standard and impose strict liability on false 
news without chilling true speech194 by imposing symbolic damages:  for 
example, a court might issue a decree of falsity.195  However, such a 
regulation would be unlikely to deter publishers from creating and hosting 
false stories and would not be able to reverse the harm caused by multitudes 
of social media users seeing and believing the content.  Furthermore, judicial 
hurdles beyond the First Amendment also create barriers to any direct 
prohibition on fake news.  Without a concrete and particularized harm, 
plaintiffs would not have standing to bring actions against fake news 
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publishers in federal court, which means general harms to democratic 
institutions would not be legally actionable.196  State action against online 
republishers would likely be preempted by § 230, which makes liability in 
states with lenient standing requirements untenable.197 
Given the Supreme Court’s failure to afford substantial protections for 
listeners in its First Amendment jurisprudence and the government’s inability 
to restrict false news following Alvarez, an entirely new approach is 
necessary to fight fake news. 
IV.  LICENSING PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS 
A solution to the fake news problem should enhance the truth-seeking 
function of the marketplace of ideas by incorporating both Millian 
protections that enable speakers to feel comfortable contributing to public 
discourse without fear of liability and Kantian protections that allow listeners 
to receive credible information to help inform their opinions.  By 
encompassing both protections for speakers and listeners, fake news 
regulation should ensure that “everything worth saying shall be said”198 
while eliminating market inefficiencies caused by bad faith speakers who 
seek to manipulate and deceive listeners rather than participate in the search 
for ideological truth and public good.199 
One plausible way to achieve this balance between protections for 
speakers and listeners would be to license professional journalists in the same 
way as other professionals.  Journalists’ special access to information 
justifies regulation of this sort.  As nonlawyers and nondoctors are unable to 
access specialized information about law or medicine, lay people are unable 
to independently evaluate the quality of information in the facts 
marketplace.200  Because professionals serve important roles that are 
inaccessible to others, clients of professionals “are entitled to rely on the truth 
and accuracy of the professional’s judgment.”201  Similarly, journalists often 
have investigatory resources and press privileges bestowing them with 
information that others cannot access; like clients of other professionals, 
media consumers should be able to trust journalists and rely on information 
they distribute as intermediaries between information sources and media 
consumers.202  Lawyers and doctors are expected to put the well-being of 
their clients over their own interests because they serve important roles that 
enhance the public good.203  It follows that journalists could put the interests 
 
 196. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–62 (1992). 
 197. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability 
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”). 
 198. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
 201. See POST, supra note 15, at 47. 
 202. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 203. See POST, supra note 15, at 47–48. 
2650 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
of their listeners over their own because of their essential role as guardians 
of democratic discourse.204 
Regulation of journalists as professionals would enhance protections for 
listeners while maintaining the same level of participation from speakers in 
the ideas marketplace.  First, professional journalists would be subject to 
statutory disciplinary rules that ensure ethical reporting.  These rules would 
require journalists, when acting in their professional capacities, to reasonably 
investigate facts and accurately convey reported information.  An ethics code 
of this sort would help alleviate the fake news problem by providing the 
public with trusted sources of factual information.  Because people have 
difficulty identifying fake news and fact-checking their sources, a group of 
state-approved, but not public, professional journalists and legitimate news 
organizations would enable people to rely on the information they receive 
from these sources.  Restored trust in legitimate media would also bolster its 
ability to act as a watchdog of government and combat the deleterious effect 
that fake news has on influencing public opinion.205 
Second, professional journalists would be required to continue journalistic 
education throughout their careers in order to maintain their special status.  
Continuing education in information gathering using new technology and 
best practices on how to avoid manipulation by malevolent actors would 
ensure that the public receives high-quality factual information from 
journalists.  This information would better serve democracy by giving the 
public an enhanced ability to develop informed opinions.206 
Finally, these regulations would not preclude nonjournalists from 
publishing news.  This means that lay people would be able to contribute as 
much speech, valuable or otherwise, to the ideas marketplace without fear of 
government prosecution or oversight.207  Speakers would retain broad 
freedoms in sharing information.  But listeners would no longer be as 
susceptible to manipulation by deceitful speakers because they would have 
reliable, state-licensed sources to turn to in order to better inform their 
decisions.  To ensure that journalists are able to speak freely as citizens as 
well as professionals, they would be required to disclose that they are not 
speaking in their professional capacities when making statements directed to 
the public at large. 
Licensed journalists who violate the ethics code or fail to meet their 
continuing education requirements could be reported to state boards for 
investigation.  If found to have negligently violated state licensing rules, 
these professional journalists would not be subject to civil fines or criminal 
punishments that would be construed as burdens on free speech.208  They 
would instead lose their professional licenses, but they would be free to 
continue publishing their stories as laypersons. 
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Although regulation of professionals is typically considered outside the 
purview of the First Amendment,209 it is possible that this regulatory regime 
could be considered a content-based speech regulation because it 
discriminates against false content.  But it would likely survive strict scrutiny 
review.  Ethical oversight of journalists serves compelling government 
interests of enabling free and open discourse and protecting election 
integrity.210  Because true counterspeech is ineffective in countering fake 
news,211 this slightly more restrictive remedy is permissible.  It is narrowly 
tailored to achieving the compelling government interests described above 
because it addresses provable harms to democracy and does not chill speech 
by threatening civil or criminal liability to speakers who assert false political 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The fake news problem presents a number of threats to U.S. democracy 
because it undermines people’s ability to rely on information sources and 
interferes with their ability to form reasoned opinions and make rational 
decisions as citizens.  Both an informed public and a strong press are crucial 
to democratic self-governance.  Fake news threatens democracy by making 
citizens vulnerable to manipulation that could cause them to vote against their 
interests, adopt unfounded beliefs, or distrust legitimate media.  Although the 
First Amendment protects false speech, the broad protections for 
constitutionally valueless and harmful fake news are inconsistent with its 
goals of ensuring that the marketplace of ideas is robust and efficient.  
Statutory rules licensing professional journalists would be one permissible 
way to fight fake news within the confines of the First Amendment. 
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